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An Analysis of Neutralizations 
Leigh Dickey 
A D V I S O R :  D R .  L O I S  P R E S S E R  
Introduction 
This paper asks how citizens discursively legitimize state torture. It is based on Sykes and 
Matza’s (1957) theory of “techniques of neutralization,” or verbalizations that legitimize a moral 
trespass.  I found that use of neutralizations, such as denial of the victim, permit both 
indifference to and ignorance of torture. Determining the neutralizations used by individuals 
condoning torture illuminates the relationship between citizens and actions taken by the state on 
their behalf. 
Torture and Citizen Tolerance 
Torture was first codified as a violation of human rights in the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Article 5 of the UDHR stipulates that “No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  
Subsequent covenants, the most important of which are the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), have affirmed this. Torture is also prohibited under 
international humanitarian law, as laid out in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  
In Article 1 of the ICCPR, torture is defined as 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed 
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity. 
As a human right, torture is the use of physical or mental harm by authorities of the state, or 
someone empowered indirectly those authorities; physical or mental abuse perpetrated by 
individuals not acting on the authority of the state falls under criminal law, not international law.  
While some human rights are derogable- that is, they may be suspended by the state “in 
time of public emergency” (Article 4 paragraph 1 of the ICCPR)- the right against torture is one 
of a handful of rights that is non-derogable, meaning that it cannot be suspended by the state at 
any time, for any reason (Article 4 paragraph 2 of the ICCPR).  
 Despite having been prohibited by international law since the mid-twentieth century, 
torture is still used by states throughout the world. Though states often claim they use torture to 
extract from victims information critical to national security, in most cases torture is a form of 
political repression, rather than intelligence gathering. In fact, torture as a means of gathering 
accurate information has been established as ineffective (Rejali, 2007, p. 469-479). Thus, torture 
is revealed as a means by which the state exerts its control over individuals, not as a useful tool 
of national security. The American public generally condemns torture per se, but grants its 
legitimacy under certain conditions (Gronke et al., 2010).   
One of the most puzzling questions concerning modern torture practices is, as Darius 
Rejali (2007) observes, “How is it that democracy and torture can coexist?” (p. 22). Why do 
liberal democracies, with their supposed dedication to civil liberties and human rights, continue 
to tacitly approve the use of torture as an interrogation technique? This approval is especially 
troubling when it is far from guaranteed “that the prisoner has the information you seek, that the 
lack of that information will indeed mean someone will die, and that cruel methods extract 
reliable information” (Conroy, 200, p. 216) in any given situation. 
 Is the use of torture in liberal democracies the result of the bureaucratization of moral 
decisions in the modern state, that there is a distance between the opinions of the average citizen 
and those making day-to-day governing decisions? In On Violence, Hannah Arendt (1969) 
describes bureaucracy as “the rule of an intricate system of bureaus in which no men, neither one 
nor the best, neither the few nor the many, can be held responsible, and which could properly be 
called rule by Nobody.” “It is this state of affairs,” she continues, “making it impossible to 
localize responsibility and to identify the enemy, that is among the most potent causes of the 
current world-wide rebellious unrest, its chaotic nature, and its dangerous tendency to get out of 
control and to run amuck” (p. 35-56).  
Such a “state of affairs” makes bureaucratic decision-making easy, because no one- 
neither bureaucratic workers, army interrogators, elected officials, nor the common voter- is held 
responsible for the consequences of actions taken. But if responsibility for bureaucratic decisions 
is easily avoided, so too is responsibility for moral decisions easily denied. Thus the “intricate 
system of bureaus” protects actors- bureaucrats, elected officials, army personnel, voters- from 
the consequences of their actions, be they participation in implicated agencies, policy initiatives, 
following orders, or support for particular candidates. So bureaucratization and the distance 
between the modern citizen and his or her government muddies the reality of ideal democracy, in 
which each citizen is responsible for having a working knowledge of the actions of his or her 
government (Lippmann, 1922).  
Then, too, states may keep practices of torture invisible to the public.  John Conroy 
(2000) observes: 
In various nations in which notorious regimes have fallen, there has been a public 
acknowledgement that people were tortured. In democracies of long standing in which 
torture has taken place, however, denial takes hold and official acknowledgement is 
extremely slow in coming, if it appears at all (p. 244). 
Yet torture occurs even where citizens know about it, as seen in with the revelation of US torture 
use in Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay (Cole, 2009).  Indeed, one of the most important 
grounds of the problem of torture is citizen tolerance: why has liberal, democratic states’ 
continued use of torture been tolerated and/or ignored by citizens? Is it because of a lack of 
information about the practice, purpose, and efficacy of torture? If it is true, as Gronke et al. 
(2010) assert, “that a majority of Americans were opposed to torture throughout the Bush 
presidency,” why did torture continue to be used by American agents, in direct opposition to the 
will of the majority of American citizens?  
To answer these questions, I set out to determine how American citizens justify torture. 
Analyzing how individuals justify torture will shed light on how human rights abuses generally 
are legitimated by members of democratic societies. Such legitimations form the cultural basis 
for the tolerance of torture by these societies. People’s rhetoric about torture is matter of concern 
because we know that talk is a carrier for culture: as Sykes and Matza (1957) point out, the way 
people describe circumstances, “these ‘definitions of the situation’ …are extensions of patterns 
of thought prevalent in society” (p. 669). We also know that talk conditions action, and that the 
way individuals speak about something is a good indication of how they will act toward it in 
future circumstances.  
We can understand “politics” and political/state actions only by taking into account 
peoples’ daily realities. The use of language is one such reality, as it will reveal cultural 
discourses concerning the power of states vis-à-vis the rights of groups and individuals. If we can 
discern how people talk about torture, we gain tools for preventing tolerance of torture and 
therefore, hopefully too, its use. 
 
Methodology 
Qualitative interviews with 29 individuals were conducted by a research team consisting 
of Dr. Lois Presser, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 
and two of Dr. Presser’s Sociology doctoral students. Dr. Presser received the University’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for this research and for its subsequent transcription 
and analysis by research assistants. The interviews were one-on-one and took place in Tennessee 
between June 2009 and August 2010. They took place at varied locations including campus 
offices, participants’ homes, and coffee shops. The participants were Tennessee residents aged 
21 to 62, and, other than their uniform state residence, they were diverse in occupation, race, 
gender, and urban versus rural residence. Interview duration ranged from 29 to 170 minutes.  
Virtually all of the interviews were digitally recorded, then transcribed for analysis by Dr. 
Presser, a graduate student in Sociology, and the author of this paper.   
The interviewers began each interview by asking research participants to define harm, 
and then to explain the difference, of any, between harm and violence. Subsequently the 
interviewers asked participants if a series of actions, such as spanking children, incarcerating 
convicted offenders, killing animals for meat, waging war, capital punishment, and torture, did 
harm. Because not all of the 29 participants discussed their views on torture, only 13 interviews 
are analyzed in this paper. All names used below are pseudonyms. 
Though I shared transcribing duties with another student and Dr. Presser, I alone was 
responsible for the analysis found in this paper. I imported the transcribed interview data from 
Microsoft Word into N6, a software package for analyzing qualitative data. The first step of the 
analysis was to code the data according to any themes that answered the questions of whether the 
participant justified torture and, if so, how: the goal was to illuminate if and where each 
individual drew the line between acceptable and unacceptable use of torture. After identifying 
under what circumstances each individual justified torture, and how each spoke about its use, the 
next step was to group these justifications, using Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of 
neutralization as a guide. I also discovered and identified several techniques not found in 
previous literature, which I call knowledge avoidance/denial and utilitarianism. The final step of 




In criminology, a neutralization is a verbalization that legitimizes a moral trespass.  In lay 
terms it is often called a rationalization or justification: it is the way someone talks about a 
particular topic to make it okay. Sykes and Matza (1957), the first scholars to use the term, 
proposed that neutralizations permit juvenile delinquency.  For example, would-be delinquents 
tell themselves that they are not responsible for what they are about to do or that the victim 
deserves the treatment they are about to mete out. Sykes and Matza’s classic paper on 
“techniques of neutralization” has shaped the way articulations of misconduct have been 
analyzed for the past half century.  
The paper described five “techniques of neutralization” used by juvenile delinquents to 
legitimate their actions: denial of responsibility; denial of injury; denial of the victim; 
condemning the condemners; and an appeal to higher loyalties. Subsequent studies of specific 
crimes such as marijuana smoking, contract killing, white-collar offending, and genocide have 
shown how neutralizations qualify the moral beliefs that people otherwise hold against norm or 
law violation.  The theory has been modified over the decades, as other researchers have found 
new techniques of neutralization, and as some of Sykes and Matza’s original assumptions have 
been questioned. This paper investigates people’s neutralizations concerning their support for the 
torture of suspects by government agents. 
Sykes and Matza argued that the juvenile delinquent seemed “to be at least partially 
committed to the dominant social order” because “he frequently exhibits guilt or shame when he 
violates its prescriptions, accords approval to certain conforming figures, and distinguishes 
between appropriate and inappropriate targets for his deviance” (p. 666). Departing from 
contemporary theory, which viewed juvenile delinquency as “a form of behavior based on the 
values and norms of a deviant sub-culture” (p. 666), Sykes and Matza sought to understand “why 
men violate the laws in which they believe” (p. 666). They asserted that social values and norms 
rarely took the “form of categorical imperatives,” but were instead “qualified guides for action, 
limited in their applicability in terms of time, place, persons, and social circumstances” (p. 666, 
original emphasis), and so able to be overturned in certain situations.  
Thus, what Sykes and Matza call “neutralizations” are explanations, both to the 
delinquent him or herself and to society at large, of why particular norm violations are justifiable 
in a given circumstance. Neutralizations, as Maruna and Copes (2005) point out, work to reduce 
what Festinger (1957) called cognitive dissonance in an individual, so that contradictions 
between the individual’s actions and held beliefs do not threaten a “person’s self-concept” 
(Maruna and Copes, 2005, p. 255). 
The most common of Sykes and Matza’s original five techniques, as Cohen (2001, p.61) 
observes, is denial of responsibility. Denial of responsibility neutralizes the harmful acts in 
question by constructing them as “due to forces outside of the individual and beyond his control” 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957, p. 667). Denial of injury allows the delinquent to believe “his behavior 
does not really cause any great harm despite the fact that it runs counter to law” (p. 668). The 
third technique, denial of the victim, neutralizes the possibility of internal and external guilt by 
asserting that though harm is done, it “is not wrong in light of the circumstances…it is a form of 
rightful retaliation or punishment” (Sykes and Matza, 1957, p. 668). Denial of the victim also 
occurs when “the victim is physically absent, unknown, or a vague abstraction,” (p. 668).  
The next technique, condemning the condemners, shifts the “focus of attention [from the 
speaker]…to the motives and behavior of those who may disapprove of his violations” (p. 668). 
The speaker, by using this technique, changes “the subject of the conversation” from "his own 
deviant impulses” to the actions of others, effectively hiding “the wrongfulness of his own 
behavior” (p. 668). The final original neutralization technique is an appeal to higher loyalties. 
With this technique, individuals are caught between conflicting demands of allegiance, and 
neutralize “internal and external social controls…by sacrificing the demands of the larger society 
for the demands of the smaller social groups” (p. 669). Sykes and Matza wrote that these 
neutralizations not only follow delinquent behavior, but also precede it, making it possible (p. 
666), though Maruna and Copes (2005), take issue with this aspect of the original neutralization 
theory.  
Albert Bandura, working in psychology, not sociology, identified similar justifications 
used to neutralize actions. Bandura considered several linguistic devices used to “maintain a 
sense of morality and violate it too,” as Maruna and Copes note (Maruna and Copes, 2005, p. 
230). These devices of Bandura’s are reminiscent of Sykes and Matza’s techniques: 
“reconstruing the conduct, obscuring personal causal agency, misrepresenting or disregarding the 
injurious consequences of one’s actions, and vilifying the recipients of maltreatment by blaming 
and devaluing them” (Bandura et al., 1996, p. 364).  
Martha Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, and Philip Zimbardo, working in sociology and 
psychology, conducted interviews with 14  secret police officers in Brazil who had perpetrated 
torture and murder, to analyze how they justified such harm. The interviews revealed “four 
strategies for explaining and excusing atrocity” that are very similar to Sykes and Matza’s 
neutralization techniques: “diffusing responsibility, blaming individuals-whether victims or 
perpetrators-citing a just cause, and asserting that professionalism had correctly guided their and 
other’s violence” (Huggins et al., 2002, p. 192).  
Huggins et al.’s diffusion of responsibility mirrors Sykes and Matza’s denial of 
responsibility. In one instance an officer stated: “some guys died, but I don’t know who killed 
them. There were many guys shooting…I don’t know who hit the guy and who [didn’t]. You just 
know that people died. Fortunately it was the other side” (Huggins et al., 2002, p. 199). The 
officer refuses to take either personal responsibility or to place blame directly on his fellow 
policemen.  
Blaming individuals was a frequent justification for the Brazilian violence workers, as it 
was in the data below, with Sykes and Matza’s denial of the victim. Huggins et al. (2002) 
describe blaming individuals as “locating the roots of torture and murder in ‘bad’ victims,” 
continuing that “some interviewees asserted that violence occurs when victims fail to cooperate 
with police or through their ‘stupidity’ or because of their antisocial behavior” (p. 199): in other 
words, the victims deserve their punishment.  
The most common justification seen by Huggins and colleagues was using 
professionalism as a defense. For the Brazilian police torturers:  
A fundamental assumption of professionalism accounts was that torture or murder were 
sometimes necessary and acceptable, with those carrying out such violence neither good 
nor bad but just professionally attuned to their organization’s policies and practices to a 
greater or lesser extent (Huggins et al., 2002, p. 201).  
By clinging to their professional identities as a defense, police torturers were able to both 
reinforce their self-concepts (as professional police) and outsource the responsibility for their 
questionable actions: as policemen, they were only following the rules of their organization. The 
least common justification Huggins et al. (2002) encountered was “citing a just cause,” which 
“either legitimized violence to save a life or to save Brazil from an internal enemy” (p. 198). 
Huggins and her colleagues (2002) point out, though, that Brazil’s transition from a nation that 
accepted the use of torture to one that officially condemns it, in the time between when the police 
torturers committed their acts and when they were interviewed by the researchers, possibly 
“reflects a reduction in the cultural and political legitimacy of just war accounts for violence and 
an increase in the cultural resonance of professionalism for justifying police abuses of power” (p. 
207). In other words, the police torturers adjusted their rationalizations to fit the socio-political 
currents of the time.  
John Conroy, in Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People, chronicles the use of torture in 
several democracies. At the end of his book Conroy (2000) wonders why “notorious regimes” 
offer “public acknowledgement” of torture when they fall, but in “democracies of long 
standing…denial takes hold and official acknowledgement is extremely slow in coming, if it 
appears at all” (p. 244). He describes nine stages of response to accusations of torture that 
democracies use as a defense to accusations of torture. Though used by societies, not individuals, 
several of these stages parallel Sykes and Matza’s neutralizations. 
First, Conroy (2000) states, democracies respond with “complete and absolute denial” 
and then to “minimize the abuse” (p. 244). Though complete denial of the existence of torture is 
not seen in the interview data below, it is perhaps similar to Sykes and Matza’s denial of 
responsibility or a parallel I call below knowledge avoidance, indicative of a refusal to face the 
reality presented by the fact of torture. Conroy’s technique of minimizing the abuse echoes 
Sykes and Matza’s denial of injury. Conroy (2000) cites the British Home Secretary as claiming 
“that there was ‘no permanent lasting injury whatever, physical or mental, to any of the men’” in 
one response to allegations of torture (p. 244). A third response, “to disparage the victims,” 
mimics perfectly Sykes and Matza’s denial of the victim, who are called “‘thugs and murderers’” 
(Conroy, 2000, p. 245). 
Conroy’s (2000) fourth stage rationalizes the use of torture “on the grounds that is was 
effective or appropriate under the circumstances” (p. 245), neatly mirroring what I describe in 
the data below as a utilitarian calculus. The fifth response of democracies, “to charge that those 
who take up the cause of those tortured are aiding the enemies of the state” (Conroy, 2000, p. 
245), is not seen in the data analyzed below, but is exactly what Sykes and Matza call 
condemning the condemners.  The sixth defense is that “torture is no longer occurring” (Conroy, 
2000, p. 246) and the seventh is that the torture was the result of a “few bad apples” (Conroy, 
2000, p. 246), in a justification similar to denial of responsibility. 
The claim that “someone else does or has done much worse things” is Conroy’s (2000) 
eighth stage (p. 246.) His ninth, that the “victims will get over it” (Conroy, 2000, p. 246) is 
similar to his second, in which the government minimizes the abuse done. Both are similar to 
Sykes and Matza’s denial of harm. 
 
Findings 
The techniques described by Sykes and Matza and others concern the rationalizations of 
harm caused by the speaker him or herself. In the interviews analyzed in this research, the 
speakers were asked first about their conceptions of “torture” in general, and then specifically 
about their opinions concerning torture done by government agents to others; that is, they were 
both justifying (or, in a few cases, condemning) the actions of others as well as justifying their 
support for those actions. I have come across no study of ‘third-party’ neutralizations – where a 
speaker offers accounts for another’s actions. 
Of the thirteen interviews analyzed for this project, nine of the thirteen interviewees use 
at least two types of neutralizations; five of those nine used three or more. Three of Sykes and 
Matza’s neutralizations proved salient, denial of victim, denial of responsibility, and denial of 
injury. Individuals also used two additional justifications, not found in Sykes and Matza’s 
original work, which I call here knowledge avoidance/denial and utilitarianism. No individuals 
used appeal to higher loyalties or condemning the condemners. Two speakers used denial of 
injury. Two speakers insisted that torture was never acceptable, no matter the circumstances. The 
remaining eleven speakers qualified their approval of torture with varying conditions. 
In addition to identifying four defenses used by police torturers, Huggins et al. also sorted 
the justifications into a “system of moral reckoning that defined some atrocity as acceptable, 
some as unacceptable but understandable, and some as totally unacceptable” (Huggins et al., 
2002, p. 192). This is a useful system of categorization, and is mirrored almost exactly, though 
phrased differently, in the data below. In fact, most of the discourse of the speakers analyzed 
below is concerned with not just neutralizing torture but drawing precisely these lines, 
determining where the use of torture can even be justified in the first place.  Huggins observes, 
“each interviewee’s moral calculus was sufficiently flexible to make violence acceptable in one 
situation, excusable in another, and totally unacceptable in a third” (Huggins et al., 2002, p. 205). 
This paper attempts to show exactly how that flexibility manifests. 
 
Denying Victims, Harms or Responsibility 
 One of the most commonly invoked neutralization techniques involved denying the 
victim of torture. Though harm is done, it “is not wrong in light of the circumstances…it is a 
form of rightful retaliation or punishment” (Sykes and Matza, 1957, p. 668). Denial of the victim 
also occurs when “the victim is physically absent, unknown, or a vague abstraction” (Sykes and 
Matza, 1957, p. 668), as is most often the case with torture victims. Rick was concerned when 
the US military’s use of torture came to light not because he objected to the practice, but because 
the US use of torture on Iraqi combatants made Iraqis “fight and kill ‘til they get killed.” He 
never mentioned the individuals tortured, assuming from their status as combatants that they 
deserved the treatment. Ali also assumed that, “if you’re in the military, I think you’re sort of 
saying ‘I understand if I get captured, there’s a chance I’m gonna be tortured.  I’m still gonna 
sign up,’ so.”  
George alone asserted that torture “as a tool to get information” was never justified, 
because “it doesn’t work,” but that it would be permissible as a form of deserved punishment: 
“this is kinda sick but, the only time I can see justifying torture is if you’re doin’ it just to hurt 
the person ‘cause you think they deserve it…if you think they – they’re – they are owed it for 
some unbelievably bad thing they did…” Matt’s primary neutralization technique was a 
utilitarian calculus, but in describing a situation in which the use of torture would be appropriate, 
he specified that “you know, it’s inhumane to torture somebody but – if they’ve been involved in 
somethin’ hideous and…if it was gonna save hundreds of lives an’ – it was a known terrorist in- 
in that situation, it’d be awful hard to say no,” implying that the identity of the individual to be 
tortured as someone who had “been involved in somethin’ hideous” and “was a known terrorist” 
mattered in his decision of whether torture would be appropriate. Likewise, Michelle, in 
reference to child molesters, emphasized the identity of the victim in endorsing harm: “Torture 
torture, ah’m like I said – especially with child molesters, I think death is too good.  I think – 
whatever they did to that child, they need to do it ten times as bad.”  Thus for some of the 
speakers the torture victims are either denied personhood or deserving of their punishment. 
Caitlin and Robin both used denial of injury. Caitlin maintained that there is “a difference 
between mental harm and physical harm” and between temporary harm and permanent harm:  
If it’s something you know is going to be temporary – ya know – I think – something 
that’s not gonna cause them any lasting, then that would be – that would be okay…I think 
it’s gotta be something temporary, and – if it’s gonna be mental.  It’s gotta be something 
men- temporary…Something that won’t cause them lasting harm.  
Caitlin neutralized her support for the harm caused by torture by saying it was 
permissible only when the damage caused was mental and temporary. When asked what should 
be done to get information out of a detainee, Robin replied, “Um.  That’s really uh – that’s really 
hard.  Uh.  I don’t know: maybe withhold food and water.  Make ‘em wear pink underwear,” 
both trivializing the potential harm torture could cause to a victim, and refusing to engage the 
concept in critical thought. 
The only individual to use denial of responsibility as a neutralization, Caitlin claimed 
that, though “we have a responsibility to treat people humanely…especially when it comes to 
prisoners of war…a lot of times [torture] happens to do with emotions, like they’re just really 
mad or something and so people start doing things.” As her phrasing shows, denial of 
responsibility neutralizes the harmful acts in question by constructing them as “due to forces 
outside of the individual and beyond his control” (Sykes and Matza, 1957, 667). Though this 
exact technique was used only by Caitlin, several speakers used two variations of it, what I will 
call denial of knowledge and knowledge avoidance.  
 
Knowledge Denial and Avoidance  
Denial of knowledge frees speakers from responsibility for their statements: as they claim 
to not know much about a given topic, they are protected from rebukes for whatever they may 
say subsequently. Matt, when asked to relate his views on the use of torture, claimed “I can’t say 
that I’m highly educated in the situation.  I haven’t read all the news,” though he later provides 
conditions on which the use of torture would be justified. Matt’s denial of personal knowledge of 
the subject exempts him from responsibility for the use torture, and later emboldens him to 
describe certain conditions in which torture would be justifiable. Julianna uses denial of 
knowledge in conjunction with knowledge avoidance: she first says that she does not believe 
torture is necessary, then questions her opinion because the military indeed uses it, and then 
denies having a valid opinion on the subject, because “I’ve never been in that kind of situation.  
It’s just what I hear – over the news and stuff.”  
Phil, Theresa, Ali, Robin, and, again, Julianna all use the neutralization of knowledge 
avoidance, refusing to critically reflect on the topic. Robin, as mentioned above, avoided 
thinking about torture by joking about it. When asked if “torture should ever be used,” she said, 
“probably not.” When pressed for an answer, though, in a situation in which “somebody had 
information…about a bombing,” Robin answered, “Um.  That’s really uh – that’s really hard.  
Uh.  I don’t know: maybe withhold food and water.  Make ‘em wear pink underwear.”  
Most individuals who used knowledge avoidance either deferred to other agents to 
approve or disapprove of torture for them, or accepted the use of torture simply because it is used 
by trusted agents (in this case, agents acting on behalf of the state). Though these speakers did 
not have the professional justification to fall back on that Huggins’ interviewees did, several do 
assert an unquestioning trust in experts, similar to the police torturers’ failure to question 
whether “torture and murder were sometimes necessary and acceptable” (Huggins et al., 2002, p. 
201). 
Ali did not approve of “torturing for the sake of torturing,” but then hesitated and 
qualified her answer, saying that “not being a military person, I don’t really know how that 
works.” Similarly, Julianna at first believed “there’s probably other ways of getting the 
information out of [prisoners], than torturing them.” Later in the interview, though, she 
submitted her own views to the views of the state and claimed, “I could be wrong because I 
know the military uses this – torture sometimes.” Theresa was asked if “this acceptable based on 
an expert- expertise kind of position,” and replied that torture would be acceptable if it was done 
by “somebody that- that could handle the rules correctly,” and then added that we would just 
have to “hope the rules are written well.”  
For Phil, the fact that he had “listened to a little bit experts here talk about” torture gives 
him confidence to create intricate boundaries for allowing torture, even though he admits, “I’ve 
heard some people say torture just isn’t really – I mean we’ve got reason to think it’s not a – a 
reliable way to get information.” This, though, did not prevent Phil from thinking, “if you did in 
a particular case think okay, if we waterboard this person enough this person’s gonna give us 
information that’s gonna –I mean it’s gonna be true – it’s gonna be true information that’s gonna 
lead us to save a bunch of people.  That could be justified.” Most individuals using knowledge 
avoidance depend on experts for their opinions, but Phil uses the fact that he has listened to 
expert opinion to give legitimacy to his own opinion, even though his conclusions differ from 
what he has heard from the experts. 
 
Utilitarian Calculus 
The most common neutralization used by the speakers interviewed in this research was 
what I will call a utilitarian calculus. When using this neutralization, the speaker claimed that he 
or she made a decision that did the least harm. Support for one type of harmful action (in this 
case, torture) over another (not using torture) is justified because it is reckoned that not using 
torture would potentially cost many lives, while the use of torture would harm only the torture 
victim.  
Six speakers, Ali, Caitlin, Jeff, Matt, Michelle, and Phil, claimed that if torturing a 
suspect would garner useful information and save lives, it would be “‘acceptable,’ if not ‘right’” 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957, p. 667). The speakers still viewed torture as harm, and were reluctant to 
describe torture as permissible: appealing to a greater good allowed them to neutralize their 
support for torture. For example, Jeff claimed that for something (torture) to be justified, 
something useful must come out of it:   
So, with torture, I mean – unless it – unless you trying to get some information like I see 
on TV.  You know, they’re trying to get information from the enemy or somethin’ like 
that.  Tccsh.  I really – ya know – I can see that as being justified, because the ends 
justify the means type thing.  But if it’s just torture for the fun of it?  That’s – that’s not 
cool.  
Matt similarly claimed that the decision to torture someone is “a balance.  It- the- it’s like a 
moral balance.” Although “it’s inhumane to torture somebody,” Matt continued, “if they’ve been 
involved in somethin’ hideous and you’re doing it to save hundreds of lives, you got to – to me a 
moral debate of what’s more humane: the hundreds of lives or.  That to me is a balance.” Such 
phrasing, which couches approval in terms of numbers, is typical of the utilitarian neutralization.  
Caitlin is another example of how individuals using a utilitarian calculus were careful to 
draw the lines of their support: they would support the use of torture, but only a “very very small 
number of times, maybe,” and it “really depends – on the situation.” Caitlin again mentioned the 
possibility of obtaining “information about American people…” and echoes Matt’s instinct to 
give voice to some number of people that would justify the decision, “Like something that would 
definitely harm like a (light chuckle) ma- ya know, a lot of American people.  Ya know, even – 
maybe smaller – ya know – smaller population, ya know.  Then I think like that is maybe the one 
case in which it could be used.”  
Phil similarly mentioned the possibility of acquiring “information” as an underlying 
justification for using torture. Torture “can be justified,” said Phil, if “you’ve got excellent 
reason to think that this torture will get you information that will save enough.  I mean that will 
bring about in – that will – secure a high quality enough good.  So – will save enough innocent 
people long-term.” Several individuals seemed hesitant when using utilitarianism as a 
neutralization. Ali did not accept “just torturing for the sake of torturing,” but ultimately allowed 
the use of the technique, maintaining, “I don’t know how you would get information that you 
need without doing that.” 
The utilitarian neutralization is much like Sykes and Matza’s appeal to higher loyalties, 
one of the two Sykes and Matza techniques not used by any of the interviewees. Appeal to higher 
loyalties is used by delinquents who find themselves caught between the conflicting demands of 
two groups, for example “the claims of friendship and the claims of the law” (Sykes and Matza, 
1957, p. 669). While the delinquent does not necessarily reject society’s norms, “other norms, 
held to be more pressing or involving a higher loyalty, are accorded precedence” (Sykes and 
Matza, 1957, p. 669) by the individual. At first glance the utilitarian justifications seem similar to 
this original technique, in that the individual prioritizes one consideration, the lives of an 
indeterminate number of potential “victims,” over another, the welfare of the torture victim. In 
fact, though, the utilitarian determination prioritizes one consideration over another in an attempt 
to minimize the potential harm, not out of loyalty to one group over another.  
Though this utilitarian calculus was the most common justification in the data analyzed, 
its parallel in Huggins et al.’s research, “citing a just cause” (Huggins et al., 2002, p. 198) was, 
as mentioned above, the least common justification seen. The difference in use may be a result of 
the difference in the identity of the speakers and the torturers. In the data analyzed in this paper, 
individuals are neutralizing the use of torture by other individuals, government agents acting on 
their behalf. In some cases Huggins and colleagues’ interviewees are neutralizing harm they did 
themselves, and in some cases they are neutralizing harm done by their partners or fellow 
policemen. Further study is needed to determine why certain neutralization techniques prove 
more salient in a given circumstance than others. 
 None of the speakers used the Sykes and Matza neutralization technique of condemning 
the condemners, which involves changing the “focus of attention [from the speaker]…to the 
motives and behavior of those who may disapprove of his violations” (Sykes and Matza, 1957, p. 
668). This may be a result of the interview environment: the speaker did not feel personally 
attacked by the interviewer’s questions and had no “need” to respond aggressively. Research 
settings have a discernible effect on the accounts that speakers give (Presser, 2004). 
  Two of the speakers, Don and Ann, asserted that torture should never be used. Don stated 
immediately, “I don’t believe in torture.” When presented with a situation in which the potential 
torture victim “has information that will harm or kill many…if he’s got – knows of a plan where 
many people are going to die – um – and he won’t talk,” Don replied, “I really really don’t 
believe torture is the way to go...I mean yeah, you need to get the information but torturing is 
wrong. There’s got to be other ways to do it than to torture.” Ann, in the midst of a conversation 
concerning whether or not it was permissible to kill someone to prevent them from killing others, 
brought up of her own accord that such an individual, “If they were captured …should be 
incarcerated.  Um.  Should they be tortured?  No.  I don’t believe that.  I don’t believe that 
torture in any form should be – tolerated.  It’s a hard emotional decision.” A larger sample is 
needed to determine the extent to which Don and Ann truly express a minority view. 
 
Conclusions  
From the interviews analyzed in this paper, several conclusions can be drawn. First, 
individuals defer to other agents to justify the latter’s use of torture. In many cases the speakers 
claimed an absence of knowledge on the topic, and then fell back on a default position of trust in 
the state. This default trust in decisions made by government agents reinforces both Arendt’s 
theory of the banality of evil and Weber’s conception of the bureaucratization of moral decisions 
in the modern state. Individuals permit the harm caused by torture both because of the 
psychological distance between themselves and said harm (Arendt, 1963), and because, simply, 
the state has a monopoly on violence (Weber, 1968). Because the state has a monopoly on the 
use of legitimate violence, when the state uses torture, and individuals have no other framework 
with which to judge the legitimacy of torture, torture is deemed to be a legitimate use of 
violence. One question that deserves further study is why absence of knowledge of a topic - in 
this case, torture - leads to initial endorsement of the harmful act, rather than its rejection. 
More research is also needed to establish why certain neutralization techniques prove 
more salient in a given circumstance than others. Such information would help determine 
whether widespread education about the nature of torture could effectively prevent tolerance of 
it. Would, for example, the information that torture is used most often as a tool of repression, not 
information gathering, and that regardless, the information gained by use of torture is not 
reliable, effectively preclude the use of the most common neutralizations seen, those involving a 
utilitarian calculus?  Would more information on the exact techniques used, and personal 
information about the victims, prevent the use of denial of injury or denial of the victim? Gronke 
et al.’s (2010) analysis of public opinion data on torture seems to imply that it would. They 
found that the more vaguely a poll was worded, such as asking about “harsh interrogation 
techniques” rather than “torture,” the higher the percentage (55% in favor) of the approval rating 
of use. When asked to approve specific techniques, though, such as “electric 
shock…waterboarding… sexual humiliation” or “punching/kicking,” approval was much lower, 
between 19% and 40%, depending on the technique (Gronke et al., 2010, p. 440-441). 
 The speakers analyzed in this paper were neutralizing not just their actions- support for 
the use of torture- but also the actions of others- torture by government agents acting on their 
behalf. Most individuals do not have the time or reason to reflect on either the reliability of or the 
effects of torture. As Crelinsten (2005) writes:  
Torture thrives because those in power and those who execute their power within state 
bureaucracies, the military, the police and, ultimately, the media and the education system, 
condition people to believe certain things, to think in certain ways and hence to act towards 
others in certain ways- and to vote for like-minded people in general elections (p. 77). 
The neutralizations found in my research support this claim: torture seems to thrive in liberal 
democracies in part because most citizens know very little about it and do not pursue knowledge. 
 This, though, is a situation that can be changed. In analyzing the relationship between 
political activity and individual cognitive schemas, David Kertzer (1988) related a point made by 
political philosopher Michael Walzer, that “with the increase in the size of the state and the 
growth of bureaucracy…politics is transformed ‘from concrete activity into what Marx once 
called the fantasy of everyday life’” (p. 8). If the problem identified here is that citizens are 
neither informed about nor critical of government interrogation techniques, it is reasonable to 
believe that a better informed citizenry could alter the state’s use of torture. Critical education at 
all levels - and not just at the university - as well as a free media not beholden to corporate or 
state interests, are essential. The ambiguity of concepts like “torture techniques” or “suspect,” 
combined with a lack of knowledge about the usefulness of torture for gathering intelligence, 
prevent citizens from thinking critically about torture. Were citizens educated about the 
“concrete activity” of torture, and information about its use by the state freely and easily 
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